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The Political Economy of Organisational 
Violence in Chinese Industry 
Huisheng SHOU and Gary S. GREEN 
Abstract: “Organisational violence” involves wilful, illegal business 
behaviour that has the potential to harm workers, consumers, or the 
environment. We use a combined perspective from the fields of polit-
ical economy and criminology to examine the incongruously high 
level of organisational violence among Chinese firms that exists des-
pite robust efforts by the government to put forth regulatory laws 
that prohibit it. As the explanation for this incongruity, we assert two 
conditions that synergistically interact in a bidirectional relationship: 
1) the complex legal structural barriers to effective enforcement against 
organisational violence caused by a politically biased and administra-
tively fragmented Chinese political system, and 2) a socially disorgan-
ised business environment that does not recursively message the 
wrongfulness of organisational violence. The analysis rejects not only 
financial gain as a relevant factor in the commission of organisational 
violence but also other current perspectives on the causes of organi-
sational violence in China. 
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Introduction 
The idea that business decisions that risk human and environmental 
harm constitute “violent” behaviour has been recognised in inter-
national criminology since the 1980s, and such violence has been and 
continues to be rampant in developing China.  
There’s mercury in the baby formula. Cabbages are sprayed with 
formaldehyde. Gelatin capsules for pills, tens of millions of them, 
are laced with chromium. Used cooking oil is scooped out of gut-
ters for recycling, right along with the sewage. […] “[A]rtificial 
green peas,” grilled kebabs made from cat meat, contaminated 
chives, chlorine showing up in soft drinks […,] imitation soy sauce 
made from hair clippings, ink and paraffin being used to dress up 
cheap noodles, and pork buns so loaded with bacteria that they 
glow in the dark. (McDonald 2012) 
Appalled by such horrifying stories, the New York Times reporter 
comments that “accounts of dubious or unsafe food in China are as 
mesmerizing as they are disturbing.” Yet, although the size and sever-
ity of the food safety crisis may sound unique to China (Caixin 2012), 
the harmful organisational behaviour is not confined to the food 
industry. Chinese firms’ neglect of worker safety and environmental 
concerns are equally horrifying. Injuries, poisonings, and explosions, 
among other organisational accidents occurring on China’s factory 
floors due to wanton disregard for basic safety measures, happen far 
more often than even an anti-sweatshop activist could imagine. Simi-
larly, the pollution caused by firms can be astonishing in scale and 
might have persisted for years before a severe accident exposed them 
to public attention, such as the pollution of the Songhua River by 
Jilin Petrochemical Corporation in 2005, the leakage of acid wastes in 
Fujian Province in 2010 by Zijin Mining, a leading gold and copper 
producer and refiner in China, and pollution by Harbin Pharmaceut-
ical Group in 2011 in Heilongjiang Province that caused serious water, 
land, and air contamination in the surrounding neighbourhoods.  
The most interesting part of this phenomenon, however, is not 
the prevalence and the magnitude of the harmful and deadly activities 
by Chinese firms, but their wanton disregard of media exposure, pub-
lic outrage, and legal deterrence. For instance, the 2008 melamine-
contaminated infant formula scandal shocked not only China but also 
the rest of the world. However, some Chinese dairy producers have 
continued their poisonous practices, as illustrated by the multiple 
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scandals since 2008 associated with Mengniu and Yili, China’s largest 
dairy producers, which further damaged consumer trust in that indus-
try.  
How do we understand the sheer magnitude of organisational 
violence by Chinese firms, their persistent denial of wrongdoing, their 
refusal to correct, and most importantly, the difficulties of getting 
them under control? The current literature provides insufficient, per-
haps even misleading, explanations of the complex interaction among 
markets, governments, and societies. Our thesis is that there is an 
incongruously high rate of organisational violence in China despite 
reasonable attempts to reduce it through governmental regulation, 
and that this state of affairs can best be understood by homogenising 
theoretical frameworks from the fields of political economy and crim-
inology. We propose that the current developmental stages of a 
changing China are criminogenic because they inherently facilitate 
organisational violence. The criminogenesis arises from the concomi-
tant existence of two conceptually independent causes: 1) complex 
legal structural barriers to effective enforcement against organisation-
al violence caused by a politically biased and administratively frag-
mented political system and 2) a socially disorganised business envir-
onment that encourages the commission of organisational violence 
due to the lack of recursive validation of norms that would otherwise 
promote attachment to the feelings of other human beings. We be-
lieve that the intersection of these structural and socio-cultural im-
petuses is synergistic in the exacerbation of organisational violence. 
Further, we assert that the numerous explanations of organisa-
tional violence that rely on societal emphases on financial success 
(read: greed), and those that advocate eliminating opportunities to 
commit organisational violence, are incorrectly focused, because per-
sonal motives and random opportunity are irrelevant to theorising 
about individuals’ propensities to commit such acts. Put more direct-
ly, we theorise about the ways in which we can reduce individuals’ 
propensities to commit organisational violence as opposed to merely 
masking or distorting those propensities temporarily through legal 
threats or attempts to thwart opportunities. We therefore argue that 
we must look deeper into the social normative systems that affect the 
morality of people in order to understand what makes firm managers 
less willing to comply and self-regulate in these areas regardless of the 
level of enforcement.  
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What Constitutes “Organisational Violence”? 
It is essential to articulate what constitutes “organisational violence” 
at the outset of our discussion so that the phenomenon in question 
has meaningful, concrete boundaries for our analysis. Even though in 
many cases of organisational violence the infliction of physical harm 
to humans is indirect, organisational violence nevertheless evinces a 
commonality with more traditional forms of immediately harmful 
violence (for instance, assault, rape, murder): a wilful disregard for the 
physical well-being of other humans.  
The idea of organisational violence is not at all new. Referencing 
writing about organisational violence could go back at least as far as 
Marx and Engels’s discussion of harmful working conditions in Das 
Kapital (Marx 1867). One could also point to Upton Sinclair’s early 
work The Jungle (1906), a historical novel that depicted unsafe con-
sumer-product distribution, dangerous working conditions, and bio-
hazardous pollution knowingly committed by executives of large 
meatpacking plants. As for the specific use of the term, Ralph Nad-
er’s (1971) piece “Corporate Violence Against the Consumer” may be 
the first written connection between intentional organisational deci-
sions that harm humans and the idea of “violence.” Several others 
invoked the concept over the following decade and a half, such as 
Monahan, Novaco, and Geis (1979), Tye (1985), and Hills (1987). 
Since then, using the concept of “violence” in relation to organisa-
tional behaviour that is physically harmful to humans has become 
routine in international criminology.  
Elsewhere (Green and Shou 2015), we have extracted from many 
academic works on organisational violence nine basic dimensions of 
“violence” committed by organisational actors in their organisational 
capacity that reflect a heuristic upon which a majority of international 
criminologists would agree:  
 organisational violence should not be limited to any kind or any 
size of organisation, and the organisation must not primarily op-
erate for criminal purposes or by criminal means, including enti-
ties that have no employees;  
 it must involve an act to which there is a governmental penalty 
attached (including criminal acts, regulatory violations and, in the 
case of China, “gross negligence” but not simple negligence);  
 it should involve foreseeable risk of harm rather than actual harm;  
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 it should be limited to risk of physical harm;  
 the unit of behavioural analysis should be the actor and not the 
organisation;  
 non-accidental intentionality must be established by actor partici-
pation in the creation of the risk, the actor condoning the risk, or 
the actor being wilfully ignorant of the risk (wilful ignorance be-
ing the failure to investigate a possible occurrence of organisa-
tional violence despite knowledge of circumstances that would 
lead a reasonable person to investigate whether a risk will occur 
or has occurred);  
 organisational violence must be committed for the benefit of the 
connected organisation in some way;  
 the actor’s behaviour must be verified as the proximate cause of 
the risk; and  
 organisational violence should not at this time include non-
human animal victims.  
Thus, we offered the following operationalisation of what we are 
terming here as “organisational violence”: 
any non-accidental behaviors committed for organizational gain 
within a non-criminal purpose organization that participates in, 
condones, or demonstrates willful ignorance of a governmentally 
punishable act within that organization that risks physical harm to 
humans. (Green and Shou 2015: 59) 
This definition of organisational violence focuses the reducibility of 
decisions about whether to commit organisational violence on the 
individual rather than the organisation. Thus, for explanatory purpos-
es we assume that all actions of an organisation are committed by its 
agents, and this is so regardless of whether, for legal purposes, firms 
are criminally prosecuted (Herbert, Green, and Larragiote 1998). 
Businesses do not act independently of their agents. 
In terms of intentionality, note that some acts that are harmful to 
humans or the environment would not be considered organisational 
violence, even though they are illegal because their resulting harm 
violates the law through strict liability. For instance, accidental envir-
onmental events that are not the result of participation in, condoning 
of, or wilful ignorance about illegal behaviour would be excluded. To 
illustrate, the massive oil spill that resulted from the Exxon Valdez 
crash into the side of Alaska in 1989 was an accident and not organi-
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sationally violent behaviour, according to our conceptualisation. 
However, the death of 15 workers and the injury of 170 others after 
the explosion at the BP Texas City Refinery in March of 2005 would 
clearly be such a case because the documented illegalities associated 
with working conditions were the cause of the disaster and were ig-
nored by BP (US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board 
2005). The collapse of the Rana Plaza building near Dhaka, Bangla-
desh, in April of 2013, killing more than 1,000 garment workers, 
would also qualify as organisational violence because factory owners 
were informed of the cracked foundation the day before the collapse, 
their lack of action demonstrating condoning the risk, or at the very 
least being wilfully ignorant of it. The factory owners were eventually 
charged with murder (Bengali and Kader 2015).   
The application of our parameter for what constitutes organisa-
tional violence will, of course, encounter some disagreements about 
whether a given instance of alleged violence in fact meets the criteria, 
especially around the determination of whether “wilful ignorance” is 
sufficient to deem an allegedly unintended harmful act blameworthy 
of violent behaviour (see, for example, Vaughan 1997). A parameter 
for our dependent variable is required, however, and we believe what 
we have put forth above reflects a general consensus about the vast 
majority of behaviours that the international criminological commu-
nity has considered to be included under the concept of organisation-
al violence. 
Critiques of Current Explanations of Chinese 
Organisational Violence 
Contrary to the common perception that China has systematically 
ignored protections of the environment, consumers, and workers as a 
result of the country’s integration into the world economy (see, for 
example, Chan 2001; Economy 2004; Huang 2011), the improvement 
in the environmental legal framework over the past several decades 
has been recognised by scholars and experts (Ren and Shou 2013; 
Stalley 2010; Carter and Mol 2007). Our focal point here, therefore, is 
not the temporal change of China’s regulatory regime; instead, it is 
the persistence and magnitude of organisational violence that has 
occurred within the context of legal and institutional regulatory im-
provement. The current perspectives on explaining organisational 
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violence in China – economic, legal, and criminological – seem to 
have provided insufficient explanations for the incongruity.   
Economic 
Perhaps the most pervasive economic reasoning for Chinese organi-
sational violence associates the global spread of capitalism with a “race 
to the bottom” of government regulation (Woods 2006; DeSombre 
2006), especially in regard to the idea that competition for footloose 
capital drives governments to lower organisational standards in order 
to attract and retain capital. From a structural Marxist perspective, 
however, this argument is problematic because there are innumerable 
examples of concessions by capitalists to regulation of their business 
sectors to ensure the long-term viability of their own marketplace 
(Iversen 2005; Hall and Soskice 2001). It is in fact the long-term via-
bility of a capitalist system, not the immediate negative effects on 
current capitalists, that propelled the US Congress to pass the Beef 
Inspection Act in 1906 (Green 1997) and led former US president 
Richard Nixon to sign into law in 1970 three powerful new regulatory 
agencies intended to prevent organisational violence – the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Administration, Environmental Protection 
Agency, and Consumer Product Safety Commission – even though 
Nixon was strongly supported financially by rich corporations that 
would be negatively impacted financially by that legislation in the 
short term. 
Another problematic economic argument asserts that multi-
national firms force domestic firms to find any possible means to 
survive highly strained competition. On the contrary, multinationals 
have been shown to have, if any, upward effects on domestic firms in 
a competitive market environment (see, for example, Lei, Long, and 
Pamlin 2005; Stalley 2010). More importantly, this argument fails to 
explain why the Chinese firms, being increasingly integrated into a 
competitive international market, do not care about their reputation. 
Both survey data and case studies suggest that Chinese firms lack 
motivation and even awareness vis-à-vis self-regulation. In a survey 
of Chinese Fortune 500 companies, only 28 per cent of responding 
firms indicated that customer demand had an influence on their envir-
onmental decisions (Lei, Long, and Pamlin 2005). In another telling 
story, the Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs (IPE), an 
environmental advocacy organisation, has collected and compiled the 
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government-sourced pollution data and violation records of Chinese 
firms throughout China and presented them in user-friendly, inter-
active, and searchable databases for public access. To be removed 
from the IPE’s “pollution maps,” the firm must pass government 
inspection and accept an independent, third-party audit. Such a 
“naming and shaming” approach, however, did not seem to deter 
most of the Chinese polluters. It was said that out of 80 companies 
that have approached the IPE for advice on how to get off the “pol-
lution maps,” 70 were multinationals. The remaining tens of thou-
sands of polluters on the “maps,” the vast majority of which were the 
domestic firms, did not seem to care (Cummings 2009). 
Legal
The primary legal argument that purports to explain organisational 
violence in China is that insufficient regulatory enforcement is the 
major factor promoting business decisions that risk human harm. 
This surely hits the nail more squarely on the head than the above 
economic explanations, as it focuses on an obviously essential factor 
affecting individuals’ immediate proclivities to take physically harmful 
business decisions: no regulation at all removes the “fear incentive” 
to avoid business decisions that harm humans. However, as already 
noted, China does not lack regulatory laws protecting the environ-
ment, consumers, and workers, yet it still experiences high rates of 
violation.  
We agree with the claim that weak enforcement fails to produce 
a strong deterrent effect on profit-based decisions that risk physical 
harm to the public. However, we contend that even if enforcement 
were much stronger, the rate of violation would not necessarily de-
crease significantly, as long as informal social-control mechanisms – 
the micro-foundation of political and legal control – remain missing. 
Using fines to deter violators may be compromised significantly, as 
well, by the “deterrence trap” (Coffee 1981; Green and Bodapati 
2000), whereby the offender is unable to pay a fine of even moderate 
significance, meaning no amount of additional threatened monetary 
punishment will increase the effectiveness of legal threat. Thus, good 
enforcement does not necessarily guarantee good compliance if firms 
lack the moral incentives to self-regulate. As political economists 
have well explained, absent these moral incentives, enforcement by 
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the government can be very costly and ineffective, and eventually 
subject to failure (see, for example, Zhang 2010).  
Criminological
Much of the explanation for so-called “white collar crime,” including 
organisational violence, is based on some variant of Robert Merton’s 
(1938) “strain” theory, which posits that the pursuit of financial suc-
cess dominates in capitalist societies, and such emphasis has corrupt-
ed traditional social institutions such as the law, education, finance, 
the family, religion, and politics. When material success, for example, 
becomes the dominant cultural goal in a booming economy like Chi-
na, yet the legitimate means to achieve this goal, such as hard work, 
education, and access to fair markets, is not uniformly distributed, 
“strain” is generated to encourage illegal behaviour as a prime strat-
egy used by the disadvantaged to deal with the pressures that are 
brought to bear on them. Note that strain is not based on absolute 
deprivation. It is relative to the perceptions of each individual. This 
explains why businesspeople who are clearly successful by most 
measures – a Wall Street manager, for instance – still choose to 
commit business crimes. There is theoretically no endpoint to one’s 
desires for additional financial success. 
Based in essence on Merton’s strain perspective, two recent 
criminological theories – those posited by Messner and Rosenfeld’s 
(2000) Crime and the American Dream and Robinson and Murphy’s 
(2008) Greed is Good – have been influential in explaining various 
forms of business crimes. Whereas Messner and Rosenfeld explain 
many kinds of crimes committed by people of all income levels as a 
result of the pursuit of wealth, Robinson and Murphy view the pur-
suit of wealth as the explanation for “elite” criminality, and they spe-
cifically add the idea of “maximisation,” whereby wealthy legitimate 
individuals employ both legal and illegal means to achieve maximum 
profit. Clearly, the only motive for purposeful organisational violence 
in almost all cases, whether committed by those in small organisa-
tions with no employees or by those in much larger ones with thou-
sands of employees, is profit. It is much cheaper to neglect safe work-
ing conditions, to produce adulterated foods, and to avoid proper 
disposal of hazardous waste. 
However, despite their extreme popularity, we believe that ex-
planations requiring a focus on motive should be rejected because 
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they merely conflate what are in fact choices of behaviour with al-
leged causes of behaviour, and are therefore irrelevant to understand-
ing individuals’ willingness to commit acts of organisational violence. 
Based on lucid reasoning, the two most influential criminological 
theories of the past 70 years flatly discard motive as a relevant cause 
of criminal behaviour – Edwin Sutherland’s “differential association” 
(1947) and Michael Gottfredson’s and Travis Hirschi’s (1990) “gen-
eral theory of crime.” Sutherland said it best in the last proposition of 
his differential association theory:  
While criminal behaviour is an expression of general needs and 
values, it is not explained by those general needs and values since 
non-criminal behaviour is an expression of the same needs and 
values. (Sutherland 1947: 7)  
Sutherland made that declaration in direct response to criminological 
explanations (for example, Merton 1938) that fail to understand that 
“needs, values, goals, etc. [i.e. motives], in criminal behaviour are not 
unique, and explanations cannot be made in terms of them” (Suther-
land 1973: 39). Put simply, “thieves generally steal in order to secure 
money, but likewise, honest labourers work in order to secure money” 
(Sutherland 1947: 7). “People steal [for various reasons] […] and they 
engage in lawful employment [for the same] reasons” (Sutherland 
1973: 39). 
Gottfredson and Hirschi summed up Sutherland’s position nice-
ly: “crime, like non-crime, satisfies universal human desires” (Gott-
fredson and Hirschi: 1990: 10). Gottfredson and Hirschi have been 
equally as direct about the irrelevancy of motive: “[offender motiva-
tion] is the fundamental mistake of modern [criminological] theory” 
(1990: 24); “[criminological] theory requires that crime be understood 
without reference to motives and benefits” (Hirschi and Gottfredson 
2008: 221); “the motive to crime is inherent in or limited to immedi-
ate gains provided by the act itself” (Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990: 
256); and, from the perspective that motive is nothing more than 
another term for self-interest, “the existence of any item of behavior 
is prima facie evidence that its benefits [are thought to] exceed its 
costs” (Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990: 9). Thus, greed does not ad-
dress whether one’s decision to commit acts that maim, sicken, or kill 
other human beings through organisational violence is perceived by 
the offender to be the proper decision, independent of any threat-
ened consequences. Analogous to other crimes of violence, one’s 
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desire for money does not explain whether one’s decision to commit 
armed robbery is understood by that person to be a correct way to 
attain money, and a desire for sex does not explain whether one’s 
decision to commit rape is believed by the rapist to be allowable. 
Rather, it is both the degree of one’s attachment to the feelings of 
others and one’s belief in the legitimacy of legal rules that are the key 
elements differentiating the organisational violent offender from the 
non-violent one, the robber from the non-robber, and the rapist from 
the non-rapist. Therefore, explanations that focus on greed and maxi-
misation of financial success as causes should be seen to be of little 
value.  
Another general area of criminological theory that has been pur-
ported to explain white collar crimes of theft, although not specifical-
ly organisational violence, is known as “routine activities theory” 
(Cohen and Felson 1979). The theory predicts that the intersection of 
three conditions maximises the probability that crime will occur, and 
the reduction of any one of them will significantly decrease that 
probability: motivated offenders, suitable targets (victims or proper-
ty), and a lack of capable guardianship. It is a macro-level theory of 
victimisation that ignores any consideration of factors that affect 
individuals’ personal propensities to commit criminal acts and instead 
focuses on broad changes in victim and offender behaviour, although 
it is often examined in the context of individual criminal events or 
series of events. In an attempt to reduce organisational violence, the 
use of routine activities theory would most easily be applied by in-
creasing “capable guardianship” through maximising regulatory in-
spections of workplaces, environmental spaces, and consumer-goods 
manufacturing – in other words, increasing enforcement of regulatory 
law. Thus, the reduction of organisational violence under routine 
activities theory would most directly concentrate on minimising op-
portunities through maximising governmental vigilance and guardian-
ship over unsafe products, pollutants, and working conditions. 
However, as in the case of asserting the irrelevancy of motive in 
the explanation of individual choices to commit criminal acts, both 
Sutherland and Gottfredson and Hirschi also cogently argue that 
opportunity to commit crime is of no value in theorising about crimi-
nal behaviour. Sutherland encapsulated the irrelevancy of opportunity 
for both theoretical camps in the following statement: “the [crime] 
situation operates in many ways, of which perhaps the least important 
  212 Huisheng Shou and Gary S. Green 

is the provision of an opportunity for a criminal act” (Sutherland 
1947: 5). In its simplest terms, Sutherland states, “it is axiomatic that 
persons who commit a specific crime must have the opportunity to 
commit that crime” (1973: 32). Hirschi and Gottfredson assert the 
same thing: “choice of a long-term costly act (a crime) presupposes 
the existence of means and conditions that allow it” (Hirschi and 
Gottfredson 2008: 220). Put yet another way, because all crimes re-
quire opportunity, they “cannot account for the general tendency of 
particular individuals to engage in crime, and they are therefore not 
central to a theory of criminality” (Hirschi and Gottfredson 1987: 
959; emphasis added). Sutherland and Gottfredson and Hirschi 
would equally acknowledge only that “criminal behavior is sometimes 
limited by a lack of opportunity” (Sutherland 1973: 32).  
Note that people are quite capable of finding new ways to com-
mit organisational violence by circumventing existing attempts to 
thwart it. Both sets of theorists, then, would accept “the conditions 
necessary for crimes in general as commonly stated in opportunity 
theory” (Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990: 24; see also 1990: 22–23). 
However, because opportunity serves only to assist or complicate the 
completion of criminal behaviour, its only relevance in criminological 
theorising would be that it may “mask or distort” (Hirschi and Gott-
fredson 2008: 220) a person’s true propensity to commit crime. Other 
than this, opportunity would have no inherent connection to the 
explanation of criminality among individuals.   
The aforementioned discussion points to the conclusion that any 
meaningful understanding of the factors that affect people’s choices 
to commit organisational violence must transcend simple arguments 
such as greed and opportunity. And it must also transcend policy 
perspectives that merely momentarily suppress the choice to commit 
organisational violence by threatening deterrents and thwarting op-
portunity. Policy perspectives that aim to meaningfully reduce Chi-
nese organisational violence – reductions meant to last for genera-
tions – must focus on recursively messaging the wrongfulness of 
those behaviours through formal and informal social-control mecha-
nisms. 
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An Integrated Explanatory Model for Chinese 
Organisational Violence  
Morality and Organisational Violence
The most obvious influence on an individual’s decision to commit 
organisational violence is whether they believe in the legitimacy of 
legal rules and their level of attachment to the feelings of other human 
beings. The latter is particularly important to differentiate our indi-
vidualist analysis from many others that emphasise structural factors 
such as opportunity or those that focus on firms as the unit of analy-
sis. From our perspective of morality, a firm manager who decides to 
dump toxic waste into a river that is critical for the surrounding 
community or to knowingly sell potentially deadly products must 
believe that the human suffering that his or her action will very likely 
be inflicting is less important than the financial or other gain accrued 
from such acts of violence.  
Our task is to identify the factors that promote organisational vio-
lence or reduce its rate of  commission by the post-Reform genera-
tion of Chinese. Following Sutherland (1949), we argue that crime, 
including organisational violence, is most likely to occur in social 
systems that are socially disorganised. Social disorganisation is defined 
as a lack of widespread consensus about conduct norms (Sutherland 
1949: 255–256) and manifests under two main conditions: The first is 
anomie, or a lack of norms altogether, and is most likely to occur 
when a social system is in transition from one set of norms to an-
other, such as in today’s China. The post-Reform legal norms have 
not yet taken hold, as China rapidly expands its capitalistic economic 
system. The second type of social disorganisation is “differential so-
cial organisation,” which refers to a conflict in conduct norms that 
exist in a social system – whereby pockets of subcultures are organ-
ised around sets of anti-legal conduct norms or norms that are differ-
ent from those accepted by the larger society. Our model suggests 
that both types of social disorganisation – anomie and differential 
social organisation – are in operation in today’s China. 
In Figure 1, we hypothesise two explanatory variables that affect 
the level of organisational violence and the direction of their relation-
ships: The first explanatory variable is the level of regulatory and 
other legal enforcement, which is inversely related to the rate of or-
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ganisational violence. The second explanatory variable is the level of 
social disorganisation, which has a positive impact on the rate. We 
also assert a bidirectional negative relationship between the level of 
enforcement and the level of social disorganisation. This bidirectional 
negative relationship creates a mutual interaction between the ex-
planatory variables that can either exacerbate the problem of organi-
sational violence or radically improve it. Thus, each explanatory vari-
able exerts an independent effect on the rate of organisational vio-
lence, and both interact with each other in negative relationships.  
Figure 1. Explanatory Model of Organisational Violence 
 
Note: (+) Positive Relationship 
(–) Negative Relationship 
Vertical Structural Impediments to Enforcement 
In explaining the importance of the current arrangements of China’s 
political structure in minimising the deterrence of organisational vio-
lence, scholars are ready to identify a number of problems in an au-
thoritarian state that contribute to the weak enforcement, such as the 
lack of judicial independence (Yu 2008; Ghazi-Tehrani et al. 2013; 
van Rooij 2012; van Rooij, Stern, and Fürst 2015), lack of transparen-
cy (Mol 2014), weak capacity (van Rooij 2012; Ghazi-Tehrani et al. 
2013), and government–business collusion, or what Etzkowitz and 
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Leydesdorff (1995) called the “triple helix”: a criminal network 
among industry, government, and academia. In China’s specific con-
text, however, we need to go beyond these common authoritarian 
traits and look deeper into China’s political and institutional struc-
tures to more fully reveal how they fail to discourage organisational 
violence.  
We identify two factors that are characteristic of China and criti-
cal to legal enforcement there: the first is China’s over-politicised 
legal system; the second is its fragmented bureaucratic structure. We 
argue that these two factors are mutually reinforcing and must be 
understood together in order to explain the ineffectiveness of legal 
enforcement and its negative consequences on the normative struc-
ture that is critical for social control over industrial behaviour.  
At the political level, China’s legal system is unique in the sense 
that it is over-politicised and not separated from the political system. 
In fact, the highest legal apparatus is not the Supreme People’s Court 
but the Central Political and Legal Committee (᭯⌅င, zhengfawei) of 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). To prevent legal instruments 
becoming a “sword out of control” (ҡ㡎Ⲵࢁ, luanwu de jian), the 
zhengfawei was created to oversee and coordinate the legal apparatuses 
including courts, procuratorates, the police, armed police, the De-
partment of Justice, the Department of Security, and other govern-
mental entities, and to ensure that the legal system fulfils the state’s – 
the party’s – will. This mechanism is replicated at each level of gov-
ernment – down to the county – wherever courts exist. At the local 
level, zhengfawei chiefs concurrently hold the office of police chief (i.e. 
head of public security) and other government posts. This allows the 
zhengfawei to directly interfere with ongoing investigations or cases 
and to enjoy the full power to override the decision made by the 
court to protect the party’s interests.  
This mechanism is consequential to China’s legal enforcement. 
On every level of the legal or semi-legal process, the zhengfawei can 
unilaterally put legal matters and the courts aside based on political 
directives that take place within the party structure only. Without the 
power to operate independently, the legal system loses the capacity to 
fulfil its goal and may be vulnerable to corruption and abuse of power. 
The extent to which the zhengfawei abuses power can be best illustrat-
ed by the case of Zhou Yongkang, the former Politburo Standing 
Committee member in charge of the Central Political and Legal 
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Committee who was indicted for corruption in 2015. Zhou was 
known for expanding the role of the zhengfawei significantly beyond its 
initial oversight function and for damaging judicial independence 
under his tenure. Many cases of abuse of power by the zhengfawei were 
exposed after his ousting (The New York Times 2014; The Economist 
2014).  
The government under Xi Jinping has taken steps to reduce the 
executive authority of zhengfawei chiefs in favour of better checks and 
balances in the legal system, and to restore the zhengfawei’s policy 
oversight role, so that it acts less like an executive overlord. However, 
judicial independence has never been a serious topic discussed by the 
party. In fact, the discussion of judicial independence has been taboo, 
listed among Xi Jinping’s infamous “seven prohibitions” (гн䇢, qi 
bu jiang). While such a discussion was quite vibrant in the 1990s and 
the first decade of the 2000s, censorship is now the default setting.  
This may seem surprising and discouraging, given the high hopes 
people attached to Xi and his new administration when he entered 
into power in 2012. But the decision to censor discussions of the 
topic is less confusing once one understands that an independent 
judiciary is inherently at odds with the interests and ideology of the 
CCP, which insists on its supreme role and unchecked power over 
other institutions. This, as Yu (2008) observes, constitutes a major 
impediment to judicial independence and adequate autonomy for 
anti-corruption agencies. And it is crucial to understand the problem 
of corporate violence in the context of both our discussion and Chi-
nese politics at large. Given the way the CCP currently functions, 
China’s legal system will remain toothless. But the problem goes far 
beyond the political intervention from the zhengfawei, which is only 
one of many instruments the CCP deploys to maintain its grip on 
power. For example, the Discipline Inspection Commission (DIC) is 
another powerful agency that could play an important role in anti-
corruption efforts but has instead been more of an impediment to 
these efforts. What is relevant to our discussion here is that the prob-
lem of legal dependency runs much deeper than abuse of power and 
political interference. It must be understood from the perspective of 
a dilemma in Chinese politics: that between party loyalty and anti-
corruption efforts.  
This dilemma can be best described as “dual loyalty.” As all of-
ficers of anti-corruption agencies are party members, they must show 
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loyalty to the party. As anti-corruption officers, they must devote 
themselves to fighting corrupt behaviour by party or government 
officials. Dilemmas have arisen whenever these officers have decided 
to discipline or prosecute corrupt officials even though the party told 
them not to. This dilemma cannot be truly appreciated without under-
standing the party’s guidelines for the control and development of 
anti-corruption reforms. For example, party principles would require 
that anti-corruption efforts must  
 not negatively impact economic development;  
 not challenge the party’s autonomous status (that is, the party 
has the ultimate authority in anti-corruption decisions); and  
 protect the authority of the central government (Zhu 2008).  
Using the doctrine of democratic centralism, the CCP can easily en-
force these principles and subject law-enforcement agencies to the 
party and lower-level officials to the authority of leading officials. As 
a result, as observed by Gong, “without exclusive discretionary power 
and strong political backup, many local DICs are unable to break 
entrenched local guanxi [ޣ㌫] networks” (Gong 2008: 150). 
The problem of legal enforcement, therefore, is not simply about 
corruption, abuse of power, or legal dependency. It is rooted in the 
structural design of the Chinese political system, which, due to its 
very nature of being a regime dominated by a Leninist party (Gong 
2008), does not provide much room for effective legal enforcement. 
Worse yet, as Yu (2008) points out, this structural design has not only  
created opportunities for Party officials to abuse power, it raises 
the question about the limitation of the Party’s leadership in the 
prevention of official corruption. (Yu 2008)  
Put differently, the CCP does not just lack the willingness to under-
take serious legal enforcement and anti-corruption measures; in fact, 
it has no real capacity to do so even if it had that intention.  
Horizontal Structural Impediments to Enforcement 
Whereas the legal enforcement is impeded by the CCP’s political 
control at the vertical dimension, the fragmented nature of China’s 
bureaucratic institutions produces additional impediments at the hori-
zontal dimension. The literature on fragmented authoritarianism 
(Lieberthal 1995) suggests that, though the Chinese state appears 
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powerful in controlling society, it in fact is quite incapable of implant-
ing laws and regulations through various layers of subnational terri-
torial units. Policy distortion is often a norm rather than the excep-
tion in the process of implantation. This is because governmental 
functional units such as the Ministry of Environmental Protection 
(MEP) or the Ministry of Health are replicated down through each of 
the lower territorial units. When implementing policies, the local 
branches at each level are constrained by a host of actors.   
Take the Environmental Protection Bureau (EPB), for example. 
Local EPBs are embedded in local governments and are often subor-
dinate to and dependent on the local governments. The lion’s share 
of local EPB budgets comes from the local government rather than 
from higher levels of the EPB. In addition, at any level of govern-
ment, multiple units have competing bureaucratic interests. For ex-
ample, at the centre, the Ministry of Land and Natural Resources, 
Ministry of Construction, Ministry of Water Resources, and National 
Development and Reform Commission, among others, may be in-
volved in environmental issues, and the MEP has never been power-
ful enough to compete with these agencies, despite the fact that the 
MEP has gained substantial power in recent years. Local EPBs face 
the same, if not a worse, situation in competing with local agencies, in 
addition to the political intervention of the local branch of the party. 
Furthermore, since a similar situation exists for local courts relative to 
local governments and party branches, local EPBs often find it diffi-
cult to use courts to defend their actions against the firms. 
Compared to the environmental protection regime, the regula-
tory system in other areas is no less complicated. The food industry, 
for example, is particularly difficult to regulate. It is said that the milk 
production system was overseen by a patchwork of ten different 
governmental agencies (Ghazi-Tehrani et al. 2013). As a result of this 
“diffuse system of multiple bureaucratic agents with overlapping 
authority and divergent interests” (Stalley 2010: 32), regulatory “blind 
spots” and “buck-passing” occur simultaneously (Ghazi-Tehrani et al. 
2013; van Rooij 2012; Stalley 2010; Jahiel 1998). The result is an “en-
forcement trap,” as Stalley (2010) describes: despite China’s central-
ised creation of a quite impressive legal and regulatory system, en-
forcement of these standards is highly problematic and in many cases 
missing altogether.  
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Thus, the system in which legal enforcement operates is political-
ly biased and, simultaneously, administratively fragmented. In addi-
tion to weak capacity to enforce and the lack of willingness to enforce 
because of perceived financial gains for individuals and locales, most 
analyses focus on either the political level or the administrative level 
independently. The above analysis suggests, however, that the prob-
lems have a profound political and administrative root, simultaneous-
ly and synergistically. Without political biases, a fragmented bureau-
cracy might nevertheless have had the determination to pursue its 
anti-corruption goal. With a unified bureaucracy, the political ma-
chinery led by the party – for instance, through DICs – could have 
been much more capable as well. Political bias and bureaucratic frag-
mentation, therefore, reinforce each other, rendering the regulatory 
regime selective, incomplete and, as a result, ineffective.  
Such a dilemma, quite naturally, provokes governments to resort 
to a strategy of “hard strike” (ѕᢃ, yanda) – through mass campaigns 
to deter wrongdoing by punishing individuals harshly. Many have 
pointed out that this inconsistent application of enforcement, whose 
timing, targets, and level of punishment are entirely unpredictable and 
unconstrained, is counterproductive when attempting to deter organi-
sational violence. Such harsh punishments often become ritualised 
shows of effort and fail to achieve a sustained impact (van Rooij 
2012). Instead, high-stakes, high-level corruption may rise during 
these campaigns as the attention of regulators is elsewhere and, after 
these campaigns end, the corruption tends to stay at this now-elevat-
ed level (Wedeman 2004, 2005).  
Social Norms and Compliance  
But the effects of inadequate enforcement on the rate of organisa-
tional violence go far beyond a lack of immediate deterrence. As Fig-
ure 1 suggests, political structure affects individuals’ behaviour not 
only through enforcement (or lack thereof), but also indirectly: by 
shaping the social environment that would provide informal rules to 
regulate people through norms and social networks. The social envir-
onment is to a large extent a function of the recursive messaging 
associated with the formal enforcement process. The lack of en-
forcement, therefore, fails to combat the growth of subcultures that 
subscribe to alternative moral codes of conduct. That is, the absence 
of official governmental recursive messaging against the three forms 
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of organisational violence allows unhealthy levels of immorality to 
develop and embody the opposite of legal compliance. This differen-
tial social organisation is a direct product of the lack of enforcement 
caused by the biased and fragmented political structure, and is con-
ceptually quite distinct from individual-level deterrence. 
This means that the lack of enforcement caused by the structural 
problem in China’s political system inhibits Chinese society from 
producing normative structures against violent behaviour by those in 
business. In the long-standing terms of sociology and political econ-
omy, informal institutions that are manifested in customs, traditions, 
codes of conduct (norms and rules), and other areas of informal so-
cial control that are parallel to formal institutions (such as laws and 
regulations) serve to maintain social order, and to sanction and nor-
malise social behaviours (North 1990; Ostrom 1990). Their current 
absence in China constitutes the first part of the bidirectional nega-
tive relationship between the explanatory variables that we assert: the 
lack of formal punishment based on the biased and fragmented polit-
ical structure hinders the development of informal social controls 
against organisational violence, thereby encouraging social disorgani-
sation. 
More specifically, a lack of governmental enforcement causes a 
failure in normative validation. “Normative validation” states that 
acts are not punished because they are wrong, but instead that they 
are wrong because they are punished and to the extent that they are 
punished. Normative validation through consistent enforcement is 
perhaps the most important sociological concept to create compliant 
behavioural patterns and facilitate a pro-legal organisational culture, 
and it therefore deserves the most attention.   
Normative validation should not be confused with deterrence, 
although both are anti-criminal educative effects emanating from 
punishment pronouncement and implementation. Deterrence aims to 
prevent misconduct by creating fear of forthcoming sanctions for 
committing that misconduct. Normative validation, on the other 
hand, is a moraliser that denounces an act of misconduct through its 
punishment, thereby teaching people it is wrong. Deterrence and 
normative validation operate simultaneously based on the extent and 
consistency of punishment. The success of deterrence and normative 
validation are directly tied both to sanctioning proportionate to the 
wrongfulness of the behaviour and to the certainty with which the 
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sanctions are carried out. Determining the relative effects of each is 
impossible because they occur at the same time and both result in 
compliant behaviour. Our inability to disaggregate the two effects is 
probably immaterial, but normative validation as a moraliser has a far 
more long-lasting and widespread impact on the reduction of organi-
sational violence than does deterrence. 
Foremost, normative validation will have a strong counteracting 
effect on an individual’s agency to self-define organisational violence 
as acceptable. It cuts across organisations of all sizes, one’s organisa-
tional rank within them, and geographic location. It offsets escalated 
commitments to wrongful conduct, reduces misinterpretation of 
observations about acts of violence, and thwarts both neutralisations 
of wrongfulness before the contemplated acts of violence and ration-
alisations after those acts have been perpetrated. Only the enforce-
ment of rules, not their mere promulgation, will permit those rules to 
become effective moralisers in the organisational setting. 
The second half of the bidirectional negative relationship is the 
inverse causal ordering of the first – societal/informal institutions 
underpin the function of formal institutions in that social norms de-
termine whether formal institutions (including enforcement levels) 
can be implemented as expected. Formal institutions created from the 
top often encounter resistance at the local level of a society, which 
holds a set of different conduct norms (that is, it is socially disorgan-
ised) (Migdal 1988; Migdal, Kohli, and Shue 1994). In other situa-
tions, suitable social norms (a lack of social disorganisation) can facili-
tate the implementation of formal rules, as discussed widely in the 
literature associated with social capital (Coleman 1988; Putnam 2000; 
Evans 1997). 
Thus, China fails to hold common codes of conduct against or-
ganisational violence for three reasons (Cao 2007; Liu, Zhang, and 
Messner 2001; Liu 2006; Zhang and Zhao 2007): First, the political 
structure that fails to punish the violence will create a situation in 
which social norms are absent in constraining, or are too biased and/ 
or too fragmented to respond to violent behaviour. A transitional 
society is often subject to a situation where a shift in traditions and 
values creates social turmoil because the old norms have not yet been 
replaced by new ones (that is, there is “anomie” or normlessness). 
Further, as O’Donnell (1994) points out, political forces such as the 
abuse of power often aggravate the situation and may lead to “the 
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angry atomisation of society,” or alienation that cultivates distrust and 
cynicism among citizens towards public authority and public good 
such as regulation, compliance, social responsibility, and communitar-
ianism. This not only jeopardises the regulatory regime from the top 
down, but also produces a sceptical and cynical public that is incap-
able of controlling itself from the bottom up.  
In a 2008 survey of 75 individuals relevant to food safety, includ-
ing farmers, managers of large food manufacturers, and enforcement 
agents in Zhejiang Province, participants were asked to rank seven 
factors based on their importance to food safety. The rating runs 
from 1 to 4, with 1 being “not very important” and 4 being “very 
important.” The mean for “social culture, morals and values” was 3.8, 
for “everybody is doing it in the industry” was 3.3, and for “personal 
ethics and morals” was a mere 2.6 (Cheng 2012). These data are 
meaningful, suggesting that respondents tended to blame society and 
took comfort in the fact that “everyone is doing it” in the industry, 
but did not take much personal responsibility (also see Cao 2007).  
A moral anomie is obviously in play here. Indeed, the lack of 
agreement among the public regarding environmental protection or 
industrial safety as a public good renders it too early to claim that a 
Chinese environmental movement is underway (Ho 2007). It is not 
uncommon for the Chinese public to express outrage over organisa-
tional scandals without taking substantial action against them. They 
instead often easily forget, and sometimes even forgive, firms that 
have committed unconscionable acts against the public or their em-
ployees. The aforementioned Jilin Petrochemical and Harbin Phar-
maceutical, as well as the dairy giant Mengniu, all of which were in-
volved in a series of new scandals after 2008 despite diffuse negative 
media exposure and governmental investigation, continued their 
practices without consumer outcry or boycott. In other words, the 
lack of normative structures to prevent or combat violent behaviour 
undermines and weakens the formal legal social-control functions of 
the Chinese government.  
Second, in a society absent of normative structure, individuals 
may resort to their own authorities, which may permit or even en-
courage violent pursuit for profits. Sutherland’s (1949) monograph 
White Collar Crime used his theory of differential association to ac-
count for business wrongdoing. According to Sutherland, criminal 
behaviour is learned in meaningful interaction with other deviant 
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persons. Through this association, they learn not only the specific 
justifications for and other attitudes favourable to legal violation, but 
also criminal techniques. Sutherland asserts that criminal behaviour 
emerges when one is exposed to messages favouring criminal con-
duct (including failure to demonise it through meaningful, formal 
legal-enforcement mechanisms) more than to pro-legal messages. As 
evidence, organisational scandals in China often cluster within par-
ticular regions or industries that easily share information or emulate 
one another. This is particularly noticeable in the dairy industry, 
where most firms were adding an excessive amount of melamine to 
baby formula before the Sanlu scandal broke out in 2008. Of course, 
in addition to learning ways to commit organisational violence from 
other offenders, persons can simply invent ways to commit it as well 
as methods to avoid detection, but the more sophisticated the modus 
operandi, the higher the necessity of learning it from other offenders. 
This is very true in the case of China, where academia, a key player in 
the triple helix of the criminal network, plays a critical role in assisting 
the producers to not only invent sophisticated and harmful products 
but also justify their wrongdoing (Cheng 2012).   
Third, the lack of the formal social-control function through 
punishment in the political structure in combination with the lack of 
the informal social-control function in society, working together multi-
plicatively rather than additively, weaken society’s ability to defeat 
profit as a culturally accepted alternative to non-harmful business 
behaviour. Profits often supersede morality in individuals’ calcula-
tions and decision making, as a result eroding social bonds. Once the 
moral links to other people are destabilised and weakened, it is not 
surprising that individuals commit violence for quick financial gain 
without much sanction from a society that is fragmented. In the 
above-mentioned survey of 75 individuals (Cheng 2012), the rating 
for “violation as necessary in order to survive the highly competitive 
industry” is 2.8, higher than “personal ethics and morals” (2.6), sug-
gesting that financial goals are taken more seriously than morality.  
In sum, the current social environment in China lacks normative 
validation – the socialisation factor associated with recursively mes-
saging the inappropriateness of organisational violence through the 
enforcement of actual punishment. This situation creates a public that 
is incapable of controlling its social members and, consequently, one 
that fails to sanction a socially disorganised business culture that en-
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courages the adoption of alternative codes of conduct based on the 
corruptive influences of a new capitalist economy supplanting the 
norms of traditional institutions. This downward spiral of immorality 
will continue in the absence of much stronger and constant social and 
legal messages that promote attachment to others individually and 
communally. This is especially true for the up-and-coming genera-
tions.  
Conclusion: Organisational Violence and the 
“Chinese Dream”
In this analysis, we have attempted two things: first, to present a cri-
tique of the voluminous existing explanations of Chinese organisa-
tional violence in terms of their illogical bases or incompleteness and, 
second, to reorient the academic focus on organisational violence in 
Chinese industry back to the basic theoretical models of political 
economy and criminology about the causes of wrongful behaviours. 
In subordinating morality for profit, today’s Chinese business-
people commonly take Merton’s “innovation” as their mode of adap-
tation: using illegitimate means to pursue culturally accepted goals 
related to financial success. Although this is not unusual in most tran-
sitional capitalist societies, the problem, we contend, runs much 
deeper in China than commonly perceived. Our analysis suggests that 
the social normative system in today’s China has failed to produce a 
social mechanism that would otherwise induce firm managers to be 
willing to comply and self-regulate in the areas we have discussed. 
Absent such a social mechanism, beefing up enforcement proves 
ineffective or, at best, causes only momentary and very low-rate re-
ductions. On the other hand, we have also argued that social disor-
ganisation in China is, as we have observed it, to a large extent the 
outcome of its political structure, which is inherently ineffective in 
enforcing its rules in a manner conducive to a normative structure 
that demands organisational agents not pursue violent business deci-
sions. Rather, the structural problem in China’s political system not 
only jeopardises the legal system’s enforcement capacity but also 
inhibits society from combating the growth of subcultures that sub-
scribe to alternative moral codes of conduct.  
The implications are significant at both policy and theoretical 
levels. Rather than focusing exclusively on the mechanism of legal 
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enforcement from the top down, policymakers should pay more at-
tention to the mechanism of compliance from the bottom up. To 
that end, our analysis suggests that blaming profit motivation – the 
very nature of capitalism and the market – for firms’ criminal behav-
iour is not only unproductive in understanding the problem but may 
also distract us from the real effort of reconstructing the social nor-
mative system that defines individual managers’ preferences and 
choices and, most importantly, underpins modern capitalism itself.  
Given China’s sheer size and its internal complexity, as well as 
the structural problems it is currently facing, addressing the problem 
of organisational violence is certainly challenging. Similar problems 
have occurred elsewhere, notably in the United States during the 
Gilded Age from the late nineteenth century up to the early twentieth 
century, a period known for its “crime and the American dream,” as 
Messner and Rosenfeld (2000) described. Pursuing their own “Chi-
nese dream,” the Chinese people can easily fall prey to the dark side 
of these pursuits that glorify individual material success at any cost, 
sometimes disregarding societal harms. As history has shown, once 
the nightmarish patterns reach a certain level, there is no easy way to 
reverse the course. In the United States, for instance, it took decades 
and concerted efforts from both the top and bottom, with the assis-
tance of a major economic crisis and a world war, to end these pat-
terns. China’s situation today presents additional difficulties given its 
fragmented political structure and the lack of formal channels for 
public involvement, suggesting it will have a much more difficult time 
building an effective regulatory regime and a society morally opposed 
to organisational violence.   
References 
Bengali, Shashank, and Mohiuddin Kader (2015), Bangladesh Factory 
Owner, 41 Others Charged with Murder in 1,100 Deaths, in: Los 
Angeles Times, 1 June, online: <www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-
fg-bangladesh-factory-charges-20150601-story.html> (19 Octo-
ber 2016). 
Caixin (2012), China’s Food Fright, 20 June, online: <http://english. 
caixin.com/2012-06-20/100402817_all.html> (10 September 2013). 
Cao, Liqun (2007), Returning to Normality: Anomie and Crime in 
China, in: International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative 
Criminology, 51, 1, 40–51. 
  226 Huisheng Shou and Gary S. Green 

Carter, Neil, and Arthur Mol (eds) (2007), Environmental Governance in 
China, London, UK, New York, NY: Routledge. 
Chan, Anita (2001), China’s Workers Under Assault: Exploitation and 
Abuse in a Globalizing Economy, Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe. 
Cheng, Hongming (2012), Cheap Capitalism: A Sociological Study of 
Food Crime in China, in: British Journal of Criminology, 52, 2, 254–
273. 
Coffee, John C. Jr. (1981), “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: 
An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Pun-
ishment, in: Michigan Law Review, 79, 3, 386–459. 
Cohen, Lawrence, and Marcus Felson (1979), Social Change and 
Crime Rate Trends: A Routine Activity Approach, in: American 
Sociological Review, 44, 4, 588–608. 
Coleman, James S. (1988), Social Capital in the Creation of Human 
Capital, in: American Journal of Sociology, 94, S95–S120. 
Cummings, Chansonetta (2009), NGOs and Environmental Govern-
ance in China – An Interview with Ma Jun, in: Yale Journal of In-
ternational Affairs, 4, 1, 86–92. 
DeSombre, Elizabeth (2006), Flagging Standards: Globalization and Envir-
onmental Safety, and Labor Regulations at Sea, Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press.  
Economy, Elizabeth (2004), The River Runs Black: The Environmental 
Challenge to China’s Future, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.  
Etzkowitz, Henry, and Loet Leydesdorff (1995), The Triple Helix of 
University-Industry-Government Relations: A Laboratory for 
Knowledge-Based Economic Development, in: European Society 
for the Study of Science and Technology Review, 14, 1, 14–19. 
Evans, Peter (ed.) (1997), Stare-Society Synergy: Government and Social 
Capital in Development, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.  
Ghazi-Tehrani, Adam Kavon, Natasha Pushkarna, Puma Shen, Gil-
bert Geis, and Henry N. Pontell (2013), White-Collar and Cor-
porate Crime in China: A Comparative Analysis of Enforcement 
Capacity and Non-Issue Making, in: Crime, Law and Social Change, 
60, 3, 241–260. 
Gong, Ting (2008), The Party Discipline Inspection in China: Its 
Evolving Trajectory and Embedded Dilemmas, in: Crime, Law 
and Social Change, 49, 2, 139–152. 
Gottfredson, Michael, and Travis Hirschi (1990), A General Theory of 
Crime, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.  
  Political Economy of Organisational Violence 227 

Green, Gary (1997), Occupational Crime, Chicago, IL: Nelson-Hall 
Publishers.  
Green, Gary, and Madhu Bodapati (2000), The Deterrence Trap in 
the Federal Fining of Organizations, in: Criminal Justice Policy Re-
view, 10, 4, 547–559. 
Green, Gary, and Huisheng Shou (2015), Operationalizing Organisa-
tional Violence as a Variable, in: Gregg Barak (ed.), International 
Handbook on Crimes of the Powerful, Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 50–61.  
Hall, Peter, and David Soskice (eds) (2001), Varieties of Capitalism: The 
Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage, Oxford, UK: Ox-
ford University Press. 
Herbert, Carey, Gary Green, and Victor Larragiote (1998), Clarifying 
the Reach of “A General Theory of Crime” for Organisational 
Offending: A Comment on Reed and Yeager, in: Criminology, 26, 
4, 867–883. 
Hills, Stuart (ed.) (1987), Corporate Violence: Injury and Profit for Death, 
Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield. 
Hirschi, Travis, and Michael Gottfredson (2008), Critiquing the Crit-
ics, in: Erich Goode (ed.), Out of Control, Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 217–232. 
Hirschi, Travis, and Michael R. Gottfredson (1987), Causes of White-
Collar Crime, in: Criminology, 25, 4, 949–974. 
Ho, Peter (2007), Embedded Activism and Political Change in a 
Semi-authoritarian Context, in: China Information, 21, 2, 187–209.  
Huang, Yanzhong (2011), The Sick Man of Asia: China’s Health Cri-
sis, in: Foreign Affairs, 90, 6, 119–136. 
Iversen, Torben (2005), Capitalism, Democracy, and Welfare, Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Jahiel, Abigail (1998), The Organization of Environmental Protection 
in China, in: China Quarterly, 156, 757–786. 
Lei, Peng, Baijin Long, and Dennis Pamlin (2005), Chinese Companies 
in the 21st Century, WWF’s Trade and Investment Programme, online: 
<www.wwf.se/source.php/1158886/chinese_companies_in_the
_21st_century_bl.pdf> (23 September 2013). 
Lieberthal, Kenneth (1995), Governing China: From Revolution to Reform, 
New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company. 
Liu, Jianhong (2006), Modernization and Crime Patterns in China, in: 
Journal of Criminal Justice, 34, 2, 119–130. 
  228 Huisheng Shou and Gary S. Green 

Liu, Jianhong, Lening Zhang, and Steven Messner (eds) (2001), Crime 
and Social Control in a Changing China, London, UK: Greenwood 
Press.  
Marx, Karl (1990) [1867], Capital, Volume I, translated by Ben Fowkes, 
London, UK: Penguin Books. 
McDonald, Mark (2012), From Milk to Peas, a Chinese Food-Safety 
Mess, in: New York Times, 21 June.  
Merton, Robert (1938), Social Structure and Anomie, in: American 
Sociological Review, 3, 5, 672–682. 
Messner, Steven, and Richard Rosenfeld (32000), Crime and the Ameri-
can Dream, Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. 
Migdal, Joel (1988), Strong Societies and Weak States: State-society Relations 
and State Capabilities in the Third World, Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press.  
Migdal, Joel, Atul Kohli, and Vivienne Shue (1994), State Power and 
Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World, Cam-
bridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Mol, Arthur (2014), Governing China’s Food Quality through Trans-
parency: A Review, in: Food Control, 43, 49–56. 
Monahan, John, Ray Novaco, and Gilbert Geis (1979), Corporate 
Violence: Research Strategies for Community Psychology, in: 
Theodore R. Sarbin (ed.), Challenges to the Criminal Justice System, 
New York, NY: Human Sciences, 117–141. 
Nader, Ralph (1971), Corporate Violence Against the Consumer, in: 
William Osborne (ed.), The Hope of the Powerless, New York, NY: 
Gordon and Breach, 10–11.  
North, Douglass (1990), Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic 
Performance, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
O’Donnell, Guillermo (1994), Delegative Democracy, in: Journal of 
Democracy, 5, 1, 56–69. 
Ostrom, Elinor (1990), Govern the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions 
for Collective Action, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Putnam, Robert D. (2000), Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of 
American Community, New York, NY: Simon & Schuster. 
Ren, Bingqiang, and Huisheng Shou (eds) (2013), Chinese Environmen-
tal Governance: Dynamics, Challenges, and Prospects in a Changing Socie-
ty, London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. 
  Political Economy of Organisational Violence 229 

Robinson, Matthew, and Daniel Murphy (2008), Greed is Good: Maxi-
mization and Elite Deviance in America, New York, NY: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers. 
Sinclair, Upton (1906), The Jungle, Mineola, NY: Dover Publishers.  
Stalley, Phillip (2010), Foreign Firms, Investment, and Environmental Regu-
lation in the People’s Republic of China, Stanford, CA: Stanford Uni-
versity Press. 
Sutherland, Edwin (1973), Critique of the Theory, in: Karl Schuessler 
(ed.), Edwin H. Sutherland: On Analyzing Crime, Chicago, IL: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 30–41. 
Sutherland, Edwin (1949), White Collar Crime, New York, NY: Holt, 
Rinehart & Winston. 
Sutherland, Edwin (41947), Principles of Criminology, Philadelphia, PA: 
Lippincott. 
The Economist (2014), Banyan: Tiger in the Net, 13 December. 
The New York Times (2014), Beijing Official Detained in Investigation 
of Former Security Chief, 21 February. 
Tye, Joe B. (1985), Cigarette Marketing: Ethical Conservatism or 
Corporate Violence?, in: New York State Journal of Medicine, 85, 7, 
324–327. 
US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (2005), Urgent 
Recommendation, online: <www.csb.gov/assets/1/19/bp_recs.pdf> 
(2 October 2013). 
van Rooij, Benjamin (2012), The People’s Regulation: Citizens and 
Implementation of Law in China, in: Columbia Journal of Asian 
Law, 25, 2, 116–179. 
van Rooij, Benjamin, Rachel E. Stern, and Kathinka Fürst (2015), 
The Authoritarian Logic of Regulatory Pluralism: Understanding 
China’s New Environmental Actors, in: Regulation & Governance, 
10, 1, 3–13.  
Vaughan, Diane (1997), The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, 
Culture, and Deviance at NASA, Chicago, IL: University of Chica-
go Press. 
Wedeman, Andrew (2005), Anticorruption Campaigns and the Inten-
sification of Corruption in China, in: Journal of Contemporary China, 
14, 42, 93–116.  
Wedeman, Andrew (2004), The Intensification of Corruption in Chi-
na, in: The China Quarterly, 180, 895–921. 
  230 Huisheng Shou and Gary S. Green 

Woods, Neal (2006), Interstate Competition and Environmental 
Regulation: A Test of the Race-to-the-bottom Thesis, in: Social 
Science Quarterly, 87, 1, 174–189. 
Yu, Olivia (2008), Corruption in China’s Economic Reform: A Re-
view of Recent Observations and Explanations, in: Crime, Law 
and Social Change, 50, 3, 161–176.  
Zhang, Ling, and Lin Zhao (2007), The Punishment of Corporate 
Crime in China, in: Henry N. Pontell, and Gilbert Geis (eds), In-
ternational Handbook of White-Collar and Corporate Crime, Heidel-
berg: Springer, 663–679. 
Zhang, Weiying (2010), ᐲ൪Ⲵ䙫䗁 (Shichang de luoji, Logic of Markets), 
Shanghai: к⎧Ӫ≁ࠪ⡸⽮ (Shanghai renmin chubanshe, Shang-
hai People’s Press). 
Zhu, Qianwei (2008), Reorientation and Prospect of China’s Combat 
against Corruption, in: Crime, Law, and Social Change, 49, 81–95. 
  Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 3/2016:  1–2 
Contents
Non-Traditional Security in Sino–Indian Relations 
Introduction 
       Sebastian BIBA 
New Concerns, More Cooperation? How Non-
Traditional Security Issues Affect Sino–Indian 
Relations 3
Research Articles 
      Jingdong YUAN 
Sino–Indian Economic Ties since 1988: Progress, 
Problems, and Prospects for Future Development 31
      Andrew F. COOPER and Asif B. FAROOQ 
The Role of China and India in the G20 and BRICS: 
Commonalities or Competitive Behaviour? 73
       Olivia GIPPNER 
Antipiracy and Unusual Coalitions in the Indian Ocean 
Region: China’s Changing Role and Confidence  
Building with India 107
       David SCOTT 
Buddhism in Current China–India Diplomacy 139
Research Articles 
      Laura DOMBERNOWSKY 
Training Responsible Journalists in China: Guiding 
Domestic Opinion, Gaining Foreign Audiences 175
      Huisheng SHOU and Gary S. GREEN 
The Political Economy of Organisational Violence 
in Chinese Industry 201
  2 Contents 
Contributors 231
Article Index 2016 233
 
